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1 Introduction
Returns to education vary dramatically across academic fields and tracks [Altonji et al.,
2012, 2016]. In most countries youth start facing important curricular choices at the upper
secondary education level. While better preparing those students who plan to pursue tertiary
education, academically oriented secondary school curriculums often provide no relevant job
market skills for those who do not have the talent, the interest, or the financial resources
to continue their studies.1 In many contexts, and especially in developing countries, the
vast majority of secondary school students attend academically oriented programs. For in-
stance, in the year 2013 the share of students enrolled in vocational education programs in
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa were about 15 percent and 11
percent, respectively, as opposed to 44 percent in OECD countries (World Bank EdStats).
While arguments from both the supply side (e.g. higher running costs of instruction and
facilities) and the demand side (e.g. quality concerns, lack of information about the poten-
tial returns, and social norms) may potentially explain these patterns, there is very little
systematic evidence on the determinants of curricular choices in upper secondary education.2
This paper studies the role of liquidity constraints in shaping the demand for vocational
education. Specifically, we evaluate the extent to which a large household cash subsidy can
affect sorting over high school tracks of relatively disadvantaged youth living in a suburban
district of Mexico City. The centralized school assignment mechanism currently in place gives
us the unique opportunity to observe individual stated preferences over education modalities
for the quasi-universe of public upper secondary education programs in the area. We combine
these data with individual registries within a selected municipality on the roll-out of the social
assistance program, Oportunidades, which provides cash transfers conditional on household
members’ behavior in health and children’s attendance at school (but not on the type of
school attended). The in-cash subsidy is sizable, amounting to roughly one-third of the
median household income in our sample. The discontinuity in the program assignment based
1Evidence from both developed and developing countries seems to suggest that among secondary school
graduates, the private net returns to vocational education exceed those of general education [Altonji, 1995;
Di Gropello, 2006; Meer, 2007]. Relatedly, rigorous studies from selected developing countries (Attanasio
et al. [2011, 2015] for Colombia and Card et al. [2011] for Dominican Republic) support the hypothesis that
vocational education and training (VET) programs have the potential to provide young adults with the skills
needed for the labor market.
2Few recent exceptions are Buser et al. [2014], that study the role of a personality trait (competitiveness)
as a determinant of high school track choices in the Netherland; Giustinelli [2016], focusing on how subjective
expected utilities of both parents and students shape high school track choices in Italy; Bobba and Frisancho
[2016], that consider the role of students’ self-perceptions about academic ability as a potential determinant
of track choices in the same context as in this paper.
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on a pre-determined poverty score allows us to establish the causal effects of the transfer
on high school track choices by comparing households just above and below the eligibility
threshold.
Mexico represents an archetypical setting in which to study curricular choices in develop-
ing countries. When completing the lower secondary level, students can choose from amongst
three different education modalities (general, technical, and vocational) that greatly differ in
the extent to which they prepare students to enter the labor market. The vocational track
is associated with better labor market outcomes for those individuals who do not complete
tertiary education, but it also entails higher out-of-pocket expenditures — i.e. tuition and
transportation costs — when compared with the other more academically-oriented tracks.
In the year 2013, only 10 percent of high school students enrolled in the vocational track.
On-time graduation rates vary across types of degree programs with general schools showing
the highest (64 percent), followed by technical schools with rates very close to the national
average (61 percent) and vocational schools showing the lowest (48 percent). The prevalence
of high school enrollment in the general and technical tracks — the most academically ori-
ented high school curriculums — is somehow in contrast with the very low gross enrollment
rate in higher education (29 percent in 2013), especially among the poorest.
Our estimates show that eligibility for the Oportunidades cash transfers increases the
probability of choosing a high school offering the vocational curriculum as the first option
by 4-5 percentage points. When we account for the imperfect compliance with the program,
we find that the probability of choosing the vocational track as first option increases by
6-7 percentage points, which is equivalent to a nearly 60 percent increase with respect to
the sample average. This effect is due to changes in stated preferences over schools among
applicants at the bottom of the distribution of academic achievement in lower secondary: a
result that squares well with both observed and expected labor market returns to high school
tracks in Mexico. Consistently with the hypothesis that liquidity constraints prevent some
students from choosing their preferred high school programs, the effects of cash transfers
on track choices are concentrated among those with limited access to vocational programs
(in terms of greater distance from their places of residence). In addition, as a result of the
income shock and unconditionally on the chosen preferred track, students tend to select
first options with higher tuition fees and that are located further away from their places of
residence.
We also find that Oportunidades recipients are more likely to be assigned to their preferred
schooling option. Placement in the school assignment system depends solely on students’
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stated preferences and their performance in the admission exam, both of which are observable
in the data. Since we do not observe any significant change in the score of the admission
exam around the program eligibility cutoff, we interpret the effect of the cash transfer on
school assignment to be driven by the program-induced changes in preferences over schools.
In addition, among those students who attended a vocational option, those who belong to
Oportunidades beneficiary households are more likely to complete high school on time than
those who do not belong to beneficiary households. All together the available evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that the change in school choices triggered by the receipt of
the cash transfers can have a persistent impact on educational outcomes later on — a result
that is consistent with previous findings in the literature [Angrist et al., 2006; Deming et al.,
2014].
More broadly, this paper speaks to a large body of empirical work that explores the effects
of household income and/or access to credit on human capital investments (see Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo [2012] for a review). There is now well-established evidence that direct costs
of education are an important determinant of schooling decisions in developing countries
[Angrist et al., 2002; Duflo et al., 2015; Lucas and Mbiti, 2012; Schultz, 2004]. We contribute
to this literature by showing that cash transfers can have important consequences not only
for the extensive margins of schooling investments (i.e. enrollment and completion rates) but
also for one intensive margin (i.e. curricular choices), which can bear long-term consequences
on future academic trajectories and labor market outcomes [Dustmann et al., 2014].
Although we cannot directly link school choices and assignment outcomes to subsequent
labor market trajectories, our results suggest that high school track decisions may provide an
alternative mechanism through which the distribution of income can influence occupational
choices. In fact, early theoretical work [Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Ghatak et al., 2001]
and more recent empirical evidence had primarily focused on the lack of credit collateral
and the limited access to insurance mechanisms when explaining why poorer people are less
likely to be self-employed.3
3For instance, Banerjee et al. [2015]; Tarozzi et al. [2015] find that microcredit programs lead to a small
but statistically significant effect on the probability of being self-employed. Blattman et al. [2014] finds in
Uganda that individuals who receive unsupervised grants are more likely to become self-employed. Studying
the implementation in rural areas of the same program studied in this paper (previously named Progresa),
Bianchi and Bobba [2013] find that cash transfers increase entry into entrepreneurship through increased
willingness to bear risk, rather than by relaxing current liquidity constraints.
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2 Context and Data
2.1 The School Assignment Mechanism
Students who want to attend a public high school in the urban area of Mexico City are
required to participate in a centralized assignment mechanism, regulated and adminis-
tered by the Metropolitan Commission of Higher Secondary Public Education Institutions
(COMIPEMS, by its Spanish acronym). Since 1996, the commission brings together nine
schooling subsystems that have agreed to select candidates through an exam-based admis-
sion process.4 Each year the system offers approximately 250,000 seats in 700 public schools
located in Mexico’s Federal District, as well as 22 urban municipalities in the neighboring
State of Mexico. This roughly corresponds to 75 percent of the total high school enrollment
in the area (10 percent of students are matriculated in other public schools outside of the
COMIPEMS system and 15 percent in private schools).
In late January of each year, students in the ninth grade — the final year of middle
school — receive information on the admission process. These materials include a list of all
available educational options (which in most cases are schools but can also be specific tracks
within a school), a measure of the extent to which options feature an excess demand for
previous cohorts of applicants, detailed information about the schooling curriculum, as well
as the general and specific skills provided. Applicants complete a registration form, a socio-
demographic survey, and a list of up to 20 educational options, which they rank in order
of preference. In June of the same year, applicants take a standardized exam consisting of
128 multiple choice questions, covering both subject-specific material from the public school
curriculum as well as general mathematical and language skills material. The process of
school assignment is carried out in July following a serial dictatorship algorithm that is a
special case of the deferred acceptance algorithm characterized by Gale and Shapley [1962].5
4The nine subsystems who offer schools through the COMIPEMS are: Universidad Nacional Autónoma
de México (UNAM), Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN), Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México
(UAEM), Colegio Nacional de Educación Profesional Técnica (CONALEP), Colegio de Bachilleres (COL-
BACH), Dirección General de Educación Tecnológica Industrial (DGETI), Dirección General de Educación
Tecnológica Agropecuaria (DGETA), Secretaŕıa de Educación del Gobierno del Estado de México (SE), and
Dirección General del Bachillerato (DGB).
5The assignment mechanism proceeds as follows. First, the school subsystems report the maximum
number of seats available for incoming students. Second, all applicants are ranked by their exam score, from
highest to lowest. Third, a computer program scrolls down the ranked list of students, assigning each student
to their highest-ranked option with available seats. The process continues until all students are assigned,
with the exception of students who did not score enough to enter any of the options they listed. Applicants
whose scores are too low to guarantee a seat in any of their preferred schools may be admitted to schools
with available seats after the assignment process is over. Alternatively, they can enroll into schools with
open admission outside the COMIPEMS system (i.e. private schools or schools outside the COMIPEMS
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For our analysis, the assignment mechanism and large maximum number of options suggests
that students’ listed options are reasonable measures for their underlying preferences over
schools.
The Mexican system offers three educational modalities (or tracks) at the upper secondary
level: general, technical, and vocational education. The technical modalities include the
curriculum covered in a general education program but also incorporate additional courses
that allow students to become a technician upon completion of secondary schooling. In turn,
a student who choses to receive a vocational education is exclusively trained to become a
professional technician. Each school within the COMIPEMS system offers a unique track;
in technical and vocational schools, students also choose a specialization. While the system
naturally generates ability sorting across schools, sorting across education modalities is less
evident in the data. The support of the cutoff distributions for schools offering technical
and vocational programs is embedded in the wider support of cutoffs for schools offering
academic programs (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix).
2.2 The Oportunidades Program
Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program that targets poor households
in Mexico. The program was initiated in 1997 in rural areas, and by 2001 it began to expand
into semi-urban and urban areas, reaching the area under study in the second half of 2004.
Cash transfers are given on a bimonthly basis to one of the adult household members (usually
the mother), and come in two forms. The first is a fixed food stipend which is worth 175
MX$ (around 16 US$) per month as from the first half of 2005 and is conditional on family
members obtaining preventative medical care. The second is an educational grant which
is offered to each household member aged 6-20. To receive the school subsidy, children or
youth in participating households must attend school in one of the subsidy-eligible grade
levels (grades 3-12) for at least 85 percent of school days. Students who repeat a grade are
still eligible for the schooling subsidy, but they cannot receive a subsidy more than twice for
the same grade.
Transfers increase with each grade, and are higher for girls than for boys starting from the
first grade of secondary school. Average monthly transfer amounts per child by education
level are: 163 MX$ for primary, 355 MX$ (boys), 393 MX$ (girls) for lower secondary, and
603 MX$ (boys), 670 MX$ (girls) for upper secondary. In addition, children who are enrolled
in school receive an additional monetary transfer for the acquisition of school supplies at the
participating municipalities).
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beginning of the academic year (220 MX$ for primary and 275 MX$ for secondary on an
annual basis). No household can receive more than 1,055 MX$ per month from a combination
of grants for different children. For households with children who are scholarship recipients
at the upper secondary level, the transfer is capped at 1,785 MX$.6
Although the structure of benefits is identical in rural and urban areas, the procedure
by which families become beneficiaries differs. To identify eligible households, program
officials visit every household in eligible rural localities and undertake a census, collecting
information on a range of household socio-economic characteristics which is used to directly
determine entitlement to the program benefits. In urban areas, a comprehensive census is
deemed to be too costly, thus an element of self-selection in the registration of beneficiaries
is introduced. To determine initial eligibility for the urban program, three general steps
are taken: (i) identification of high poverty areas to be served; (ii) information campaigns
to promote the program; and (iii) identification of eligible families. If a household visits a
program center, information is collected through a household questionnaire and these data
are further verified during a home visit. A subset of these characteristics is used to apply
a previously developed proxy-means targeting approach. Numerical weights are assigned to
human capital and household assets, as well as characteristics of their communities, in order
to calculate a household poverty index (score), where a higher score denotes a higher level
of poverty [Skoufias et al., 2001].
Oportunidades is a centrally run program. The administrative unit in charge of the
program is a federal agency that gathers all the relevant data, applies the points allocation
system, determines eligibility, issues payments to households, and coordinates service delivery
with other federal ministries and agencies. Hence, there are no intermediaries between the
federal government and program beneficiaries. This fact helps to limit the opportunities
for political manipulation of the program targeting, whereby, for instance, local politicians
may have electoral incentives to strategically change the poverty index of some households
in order to expand the coverage of the program [Camacho and Conover, 2011].
2.3 Sample Description
We have access to the Oportunidades eligibility survey collected in the second half of 2004
for households living in the town of Ecatepec de Morelos, which is located in the State of
6During high school, students can further accumulate funds that are redeemable (under certain condi-
tions) upon graduation from high school. For students registered in the program since the last year of lower
secondary school, this additional amount is approximately 3,000 MX$.
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Mexico, on the outskirts of Mexico City’s Federal District.7 While the choice of such specific
location is due to data availability constraints, it is important to stress that the municipality
of Ecatepec is by and large representative of other municipalities in the Mexico City’s area
as well as Mexico in general (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
The Oportunidades dataset contains information on household socio-demographics, the
proxy-means score used to determine program eligibility, and the bimonthly record of total
cash disbursements from 2005 to 2010. The COMIPEMS dataset features applicants’ address
of residence, socio-demographic characteristics, past schooling trajectories, the ranked lists
of schooling options requested during the application process, and related information about
students’ placement in the system (including their score in the admission exam). We merge at
the individual level these two datasets using student identifiers.8 After excluding applicants
who lack basic necessary information, we are left with a final sample of 5,232 students
who applied in the school assignment system during the period comprised of between 2005
and 2010. Of those, 4,234 (81 percent) were assigned in one of the high school programs
offered through the centralized mechanism. Using the same student identifiers, we also match
roughly half of the applicants in our sample with individual records in the period comprised
of between 2008 and 2013 of the national achievement test of 12th graders, which is carried
out in all high schools in Mexico (except those belonging to the UNAM subsystem).
In our sample, 3,180 (61 percent) applicants belong to households that are deemed eligible
for the CCT benefits, i.e. the value of their proxy-mean score is greater than or equal to 0.69.
Among program eligible students, 2,161 (68 percent) are reported as receiving at least one
cash subsidy before applying to the school assignment system, with a median time elapsed
between the first program disbursement and the application to the school assignment system
of roughly three years.9 As a result of the process of program expansion in urban areas that
7Figure A.2 in the Appendix depicts the geographic location of the municipality of Ecatepec within the
Mexico City’s area, and the spatial distribution of the schools participating in the school assignment system.
8All COMIPEMS applicants have a 16 digit unique student identifier (CURP), that is generated by
combining information on student’s name, surname, date of birth and state of birth, plus a 2 digit random
generated number. All the relevant demographic information is collected by the Oportunidades survey,
allowing us to construct a “pseudo-CURP”, that only differs from the student identifier in the 2 digit
randomly generated number. After removing all the individuals where there is missing information or a
“pseudo-CURP” that can be potentially matched with 2 or more CURPs, we are left with a sample of 6,173
applicants in the age group 14-20.
9Program take-up rates are fairly high when compared with the corresponding figures reported in the
existing evaluation studies of the urban component of Oportunidades [Angelucci and Attanasio, 2009]. Pre-
vious studies use the urban evaluation surveys (ENCELURB) which entail roughly 18-24 months between
program inception and observed outcomes, whereas we observe eligible households for up to six years after
program inception. In fact, take-up rates in our sample increase from 40 percent in 2005 to 79 percent in
2010.
8
took place in the end of 2008, a very small fraction (1.2 percent) of ineligible applicants in
our sample are reported as receiving some program benefits before applying to the schooling
system. For the median household in our sample, the Oportunidades transfer is between
27 and 28 percent of total household income. The large size of the income shock in our
sample likely reflects the presence of program-eligible household members who are attending
high school (for whom the schooling subsidy is higher, see Section 2.2). In fact, the transfer
amount for program eligible families who reside in the city of Ecatepec de Morelos and who
are not in the COMIPEMS sample are substantially lower, that is, between 14 and 16 percent
of total household income for the median household in our sample. Those figures are in line
with previous studies that considered the urban component of the Oportunidades program
[Angelucci and Attanasio, 2013].
Using the school identifiers, we further link the applicants’ stated school preferences and
assignment with the biannual Mexican school census, which collects information on school-
level yearly trajectories, e.g. enrollment, failure rate, etc, school infrastructure, as well as
detailed information on the attendance fees that students have to incur upon registration
in a given school (e.g. tools, uniforms, monthly payments, registration, and tuition). In
addition, geocoded information for each school allows us to compute geodesic distances
between students’ places of residence and the high school programs offered by the school
assignment system.
2.4 High School Track Choices
Only 9 percent of the applicants in our sample list a vocational program as their first option,
while 44 percent and 47 percent of the applicants, respectively, opt for the technical and
the general tracks. Among those who choose a technical program, almost 40 percent choose
a program that covers mixed (and presumably, more general) specializations, as opposed
to the vocational track where the most preferred programs seem to be geared toward the
acquisition of rather specific labor market skills (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix). When
compared to students who opt for general and technical tracks, those who mostly prefer a
vocational education tend to perform worse in school (the mean differences in the score in
the admission exam and in the cumulative grade point average in lower secondary are 0.44 of
a standard deviation and 0.32 of a standard deviation, respectively), and tend to come from
a more disadvantaged socio-economic background (mean differences in household income
and mother education are 0.15 of a standard deviation and 0.12 of a standard deviation,
respectively).
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An education reform carried out in 2008 allowed students graduating from the vocational
track to attend higher education, although graduates from the general track remain more
likely to enroll in tertiary schooling when compared to graduates from the other tracks (33
percent more than technical, and 38 percent than vocational).10 However, the share of low
income students who enter higher education in Mexico is extremely low: in 2013 students
coming from the lowest household income quintile, which includes most of the Oportunidades
beneficiaries, made up only 10.6 percent of the total higher education enrollment [Ferreyra
et al., 2017]. When we look at the labor market returns of the different high school tracks
among those individuals who enter the labor market upon high school graduation, we find
that log hourly wages are on average 14 and 7 percent larger for vocational high school
graduates when compared to high school graduates from the general and technical tracks,
respectively.11 These figures may be possibly affected by selection issues whereby individuals
who choose not to attend or complete college after graduating from the general or technical
tracks are difficult to compare with those who graduate from the vocational track. However,
it is not clear whether students rely on conditional or unconditional market returns when
choosing their schooling curriculum. Indeed, subjective expectation data on labor market
earnings for a nationally representative sample of high school students are broadly consistent
with the observed market returns (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix).
The evidence presented above makes it difficult to understand why students from low
income households disproportionally privilege academically-oriented high school curriculums.
One possible explanation can be found in the relatively higher costs of the vocational options.
The more frequent use of computers and laboratory equipment in the vocational curriculum
may partly explain the fact that vocational schools face higher running costs and they tend
to charge higher attendance fees while being less geographically accessible for relatively
disadvantaged households when compared to technical and academic options.12 Table 1
shows, separately for each high school track, the mean and standard deviations of total
attendance fees and the geodesic distance from the residential locations for a sub-set of
COMIPEMS schools that are likely to be the most relevant for the school choices of the
10Data from a nationally representative survey of high-school graduates aged 18-20 (ENILEMS, 2012).
11We estimate mincer-type regressions using data from a sub-module of the national employment survey
(ENTELEMS-ENOE, 2008), which records wages and hours worked as well as retrospective information on
academic trajectories for individuals aged 16-35 (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). The specifications further
include dummies for age, gender, urban/rural residence and State of residence. The positive returns to
vocational high schools do not vary systematically along any of these observable characteristics.
12Amongst all COMIPEMS schools in the year 2007, the number of student per personal computer is 22.5
in the general track and 6.8 in the vocational, while the number of laboratory classrooms is 2.16 and 3.6,
respectively. The average yearly attendance fees for vocational programs amounts to 4,195 MX$ (around
315 US$) as opposed to 2,794 MX$ for technical programs costs and 3,772 MX$ for academic programs.
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applicants in our sample. The average attendance cost for the vocational programs that
are most closely located from the students’ places of residence is 4,700 MX$ (around 350
US$), which roughly corresponds to 15 percent of the median household income in our
sample, compared to 3,980 MX$ and 2,390 MX$ for the closest general and technical schools,
respectively. In addition, the closest general and technical schools are located, on average, 1
km and 2 km away, respectively, whereas the closest vocational school is located 3.3 km away
from the applicants’ residences (see Panel A). Similar patterns hold when we alternatively
consider the 10 nearest options in each high school track (see Panel B).
Table 1: Schooling Costs Across High-School Tracks
(1) (2) (3)
General Technical Vocational
Panel A: Nearest schools by track
Attendance Fees (MX$) 3,981 2,388 4,699
(1,784) (1,242) (1,086)
Geodesic Distance (Km) 1.26 2.01 3.25
(0.98) (1.22) (1.77)
Panel B: Ten nearest schools by track
Average Attendance Fees (MX$) 3,629 2,934 4,516
(547.9) (614.5) (368.2)
Average Geodesic Distance (Km) 3.88 5.75 8.78
(1.19) (1.13) (2.23)
Notes: Nearest schools selected using the geodesic distance between the lo-
cation of the applicants’ residences and the locations of all the COMIPEMS
schools. Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) computed over the
applicants in our sample. All mean differences between tracks are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Total attendance fees refer to the year 2009
(current exchange rate MX$/US$=13.33) and include tools, uniforms, monthly
payments, registration and tuition. Sources: National Institute of Statistics and
Geography (INEGI), and school census (Formato 911 ).
Relative to the other tracks, the vocational curriculum can thus be possibly associated
with higher labor market returns for students in relatively poor households, while at the
same time entails higher out-of-pocket expenditures.
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3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 A (Fuzzy) Regression Discontinuity Design
The eligibility for the transfer program depends solely on whether or not the household
poverty score exceeds a fixed cutoff, that is time invariant during the period under study
and unknown by potential beneficiaries. Let Xi denote the household eligibility score, c the
cutoff value of eligibility, and Zi a program treatment indicator. In order to account for
the non-perfect compliance with the transfer program (see Sections 2.2-2.3), we consider the
following linear regression model:
Zi = α0 + α11(Xi > c) + α2f(Xi − c) + εi, (1)
Yi = γ0 + γ1Zi + γ2f(Xi − c) + ηi, (2)
where γ1 is the local average treatment effect (LATE) of Oportunidades transfers on track
choice. εi and ηi are mean zero error terms, which are clustered by values of the poverty
score [Lee and Card, 2008].13 The term (Xi − c) accounts for the influence of the running
variable on both track choices and program assignment in a flexible nonlinear function f(·),
which is allowed to vary above and below the threshold. Analogously, we can express the
reduced-form relationship between program benefits and track choice as following:
Yi = β0 + β11(Xi > c) + β2f(Xi − c) + ui, (3)
where β1 is the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of the eligibility for the transfer program
on track choice and ui is a mean zero error term. Ideally, we would like to estimate both ITT
and LATE parameters in the neighborhood of the program eligibility threshold c. Given our
sample size, the number of observations around the threshold might be relatively small and
thereby may potentially compromise the resulting estimates [Lee and Lemieux, 2010]. Thus,
in our main specifications we use a parametric functional form that exploits the entire sample.
One potential disadvantage of the parametric approach is the bias produced by individuals
who are located further away from the cutoff when f(·) is not correctly specified. For this
reason, we complement our results showing the corresponding ITT and LATE estimates of
Local Linear Regression (LLR) models that restrict the sample to the observations around
13The poverty score is approximated at the third decimal digit, which implies a few repeated observations
at some specific values. Estimation results (available upon request) are very similar when we instead use
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
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the score eligibility cutoff.
In order to interpret the likelihood of receiving the program benefits as the result of a
local randomization in a neighborhood of the eligibility cutoff, the probability of receiving
the Oportunidades benefits needs to change discontinuously at the eligibility cutoff and
the assignment variable has to be continuously distributed around the eligibility cutoff.
The latter assumption is akin to assuming that households cannot precisely manipulate the
poverty score in order to be eligible for the transfer [Lee, 2008]. Two additional assumptions
are needed for (non-parametric) identification of the LATE parameter in Equations (1)-(2)
[Hahn et al., 2001]: monotonicity of the treatment assignment; and scoring above threshold
cannot impact track choices except through the effect of the transfer (exclusion restriction).
To our knowledge, in the context under study there are no other government-sponsored
programs that use the same poverty score and its related assignment rule. In the next
section, we discuss the plausibility of these assumptions in our sample.
3.2 Validity of the RD Design
We start by assessing the empirical density of the assignment variable around the cutoff
of program eligibility. Martinelli and Parker [2009] find evidence that households tend to
under-report goods and desirable home characteristics in order to increase the chances of
being eligible for the Oportunidades program. In the absence of perfect monitoring of the
self-reported information, we might thus observe a discrete jump in the distribution of the
household poverty score immediately above the eligibility threshold, thereby suggesting that
households can manipulate the assignment variable. Using all households in our sample with
at least one child in the COMIPEMS exam we can inspect the presence of a discontinuity in
the assignment variable at the cutoff of program eligibility (see Figure 1).
There is no evidence that in the population under study, households are manipulating
the score in order to increase the probability of being eligible for the transfer. Instead,
visual inspection reveals the presence of a small drop (rather than a bump) immediately
above the eligibility cutoff. The point estimate of the log difference in height between the
two interpolating kernel regressions is -0.134 (std. err.= 0.074). This pattern is consistent
with the fact that after the initial targeting procedures are completed (see Section 2.2),
internal audits are conducted in order to verify whether or not potential recipients truly meet
the eligibility requirements. These audits led to administrative corrections that eventually
resulted in program exclusion for some households who were initially claimed eligible to
receive the program benefits.
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Note: This figure depicts a kernel regression interpolation and the confidence intervals of the empirical
distribution of the assignment variable at the points below and above the cutoff. The bin size and the
optimal bandwidth are calculated using the procedure described in McCrary [2008].
Figure 2 displays the relationship between the poverty score (x-axis) and a set of socio-
demographic characteristics collected in the 2004 program eligibility survey (y-axis): appli-
cants’ age and ethnicity; school enrollment and attainment for all children in the applicants’
households and households size; and level of parental education. The charts do not reveal the
presence of any discrete jump around the eligibility cutoff for these variables. A battery of
statistical tests largely confirm these visual patterns, providing further support to the notion
that households are unlikely to sort around the program eligibility cutoff in our setting.14
The graph presented in panel (a) of Figure 3 (see Section 4.1) shows clear evidence of
a discontinuous change in the probability of taking the cash transfer at the eligibility cut-
14The corresponding regression estimates for the full set of available pre-program socio-demographic char-
acteristics are reported in Table B.1 in the Appendix. A cross-equation test based on a seemingly-unrelated
regression (SURE) model delivers a Chi-squared statistic of 7.93 (p-value=0.719). The ITT coefficient for
the predicted values of a Multinomial Logit regression of the choice of vocational/technical/general tracks
as first options on the full set of socio-demographic characteristics has a point estimate of -.00021 (std.
err=0.0016). A permutation test based on the induced ordered statistics for the null hypothesis of continuity
of the distribution of baseline covariates at the cutoff [Canay and Kamat, 2015] delivers a p-value of 0.234.
14
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Note: The figure plots averages of the dependent variable computed over 0.10 consecutive brackets values
of the poverty score comprised between -1 and 1, which roughly entails 70 percent of the overall sample of
COMIPEMS applicants. The red vertical line denotes the discontinuity, normalized to zero. The solid line
(dashed line) is a local linear regression prediction (least squares running-mean smoothing), separated on
either side of the threshold.
off. The probability of taking the transfer is remarkably flat for those households where
the poverty score is above the eligibility threshold, and this provides some support for the
monotonicity assumption of the treatment assignment. A potential violation might have
occurred if the cost of complying with the program conditionality had increased with the
poverty score, thereby decreasing the likelihood to receive the program benefits for house-
holds in the neighborhood of the eligibility cutoff. Neither previous work on Oportunidades
in urban areas [Gonzalez-Flores et al., 2012] nor the results presented here tend to support
15
this hypothesis.
One potential concern regarding our research design is that the eligibility for the Opor-
tunidades cash transfer may have changed the composition of the COMIPEMS applicants
by, for instance, inducing lower-ability students to take part in the school assignment sys-
tem.15 In order to address this concern, we estimate Equation 3 so as to assess the impact
of the program eligibility on the probability of taking part in the COMIPEMS system. We
compute such probability in our data by restricting the potential population of applicants
in the 2004 Oportunidades eligibility survey to those who are currently enrolled in school
and whose age matches that of subsequent cohorts of high school applicants over the period
2005-2010 (9-14 years old).16 We also use two additional measures of the academic ability
of the pool of applicants in our sample: the score in the assignment exam; and the overall
GPA in middle school, as well as the geodesic distance between the closest vocational school
and applicants’ residence. The estimated ITT effect of cash transfers on these outcomes are
small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero (see Table B.2 in the Appendix),
thereby lending further support to the view that the observed changes in students’ prefer-
ences across tracks are not the result of changes in the composition of the sample under
study.
4 RD Estimates on Track Choices
4.1 Graphical Analysis
We first conduct a graphical analysis in order to document the discontinuity effects of the
program transfers on the likelihood of choosing one of the three educational tracks (voca-
tional, technical and academic) as a first option within the COMIPEMS school assignment
system. Jumps in the plots depicted in Figure 3 show the effect of crossing the threshold on
the variables of interest. The impact of the transfer on track choices can then be assessed
visually by inspecting the ratio of the jump in terms of the probability of choosing a given
track, and the jump in the probability of receiving the transfer (panel (a)). The graphical
15Another potential source of selection can be triggered by the positive effect of Oportunidades on migra-
tion [Angelucci, 2015]. If higher (lower) ability students are more likely to migrate out of the Mexico City
metropolitan area upon receiving the transfer, the sample of the high school applicants might potentially
display a negative (positive) selection bias.
16The resulting matching rate between the two datasets is 42 percent, which can be explained by potential
mismatches in the CURPs, non-universal completion in lower secondary (91 percent in the school year 2013-
2014), the rate of absorption into upper secondary (93.6 percent in the same school year), and high school
enrollment outside of the COMIPEMS schools (roughly 30 percent).
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evidence appears to show the presence of a positive effect of the receipt of Oportunidades on
the probability of choosing a high school program belonging to the vocational track (panel
(b)). Accordingly, the transfers appear to be associated with a decrease in the probability
of choosing the technical or the academic tracks, with a possibly more pronounced effect for
the former, although no clear pattern emerges from visual inspection of panels (c) and (d)
of Figure 3.
Besides, away from a close neighborhood of the discontinuity there is a clear declining
trend in the probability of choosing the vocational track as the poverty score increases,
whereas, again, no clear trend emerges for the other two tracks. This provides further
(suggestive) evidence for the potential role of liquidity constraints underlying the choice of
a vocational program.
4.2 Regression Analysis
In Table 2 we present statistical evidence for the estimation of the β1 and γ1 coefficients
of Equations (1), (2) and (3) using simple linear probability models for each track as first
option. We use a quadratic spline in the poverty score in order to control for the influence
of the running variable on both track choices and program assignment. We further include
application-year dummies in all specifications in order to account for potentially different
trends across the cohorts of applicants in our sample.
The estimated marginal effect of the program eligibility on the probability of choosing
the vocational track is 4 percentage points, and is statistically significant at 5 percent level
(column 1). When we account for the imperfect compliance with the Oportunidades transfer,
we find that the corresponding LATE is equal to 6.2 percentage points. Compared with the
9.2 percent baseline probability of choosing the vocational track as first option, the relative
magnitude of this effect is definitely sizable. The effects of the program on the probability
of choosing the academic track as first option are small in magnitude and they are not
statistically significant (column 2). The probability of choosing the technical track as first
option shows a drop that is comparable in magnitude with the positive effects observed for
the vocational track, although the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from
zero.17
We next consider three specification checks. First, we examine the robustness of our
17The lack of statistical significance for the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Table 2 is arguably
related to the relatively small size of our sample. In fact, the standard deviation of the dependent variable
nearly doubles in column 3, so that the minimum effect that can be statistically detected at conventional
significance levels is much larger.
17
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Note: The figure plots averages of the dependent variable computed over 0.10 consecutive brackets values
of the poverty score comprised between -1 and 1, which roughly entails 70 percent of the overall sample of
COMIPEMS applicants. The solid line (dashed line) is a local linear regression prediction (least squares
running-mean smoothing), separated on either side of the threshold.
findings by choosing different degrees of the polynomial that is supposed to control for
the direct influence of the poverty score on both track choices and program assignment.
Second, we fit local linear regression models for a subset of the observations that are in the
neighborhood of the eligibility cutoff, as determined using the optimal bandwidth criterion as
in Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012]. Third, we consider the joint decision on the preferred
track within the school assignment system using a Multinomial Logit model that we estimate
using both parametric specifications described above. The resulting estimates are displayed
in Tables C.1, C.2, C.3 and are remarkably consistent in both significance and magnitude
18




Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.040** 0.013 -0.053
(0.019) (0.037) (0.036)
2SLS (IV-LATE)
Takeup 0.062** 0.020 -0.082
(0.030) (0.057) (0.056)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.092 0.465 0.443
SD Dependent Variable 0.289 0.499 0.497
Number of Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232
Number of Clusters 2,907 2,907 2,907
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. The dependent
variable Vocational/General/Technical takes the value 1 if a Voca-
tional/General/Technical option is listed first in the applicant’s portfolio.
A quadratic spline specification for the poverty score is used at each side
of the cutoff. Standard errors clustered by values of the poverty score
are reported in parenthesis. Application-year dummies are included in all
specifications.
with those just discussed. If anything, the estimated coefficients are slightly larger, e.g. the
LATE of the cash transfer on the probability of selecting a vocational option as first choice
is equal to 7 percentage points.
4.3 Mechanisms
The cash transfer provided with the Oportunidades program may tilt school choices toward
the vocational track though either an income effect or a price effect – i.e. by reducing
the need to borrow at a high rate to finance the preferred schooling career. While both
channels may be at play, we cannot empirically distinguish them and hence we interpret the
effects of the cash transfers on track choice decisions as broadly relaxing households’ liquidity
constraints.18
In our setting, relatively low ability students are those who are expected to benefit more
18The conditional component of the transfer may possibly generates another price effect by effectively
reducing the shadow value of schooling. This channel should mainly affect schooling decisions at the extensive
margin – i.e. high school enrollment and attendance – rather than the intensive margin, which is the object
of interest of our analysis.
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from a schooling career that prepares them to access the labor market (see Section 2.4) as
they are less likely to continue their studies toward tertiary education.19 We use information
on the overall Grade Point Average (GPA) in lower secondary, and accordingly classify as
high-ability and low-ability those students with GPA above and below the mean respectively.
We then estimate Equations (1) and (2) by allowing the corresponding LATE to vary with
the level of ability, and we report the results in column 1 of Table 3. For students with a
high GPA, the effect of the cash transfer on the probability of choosing the vocational track
as first option is small and is not statistically significant from zero, as opposed to a large
and statistically significant effect (11.4 percentage points) for those with a low GPA.
Transportation costs may constrain schooling decisions, especially for low income families.
Using information on the distance from each applicants’ residence to the closest vocational
option as a proxy for the transportation cost that they have to incur in order to attend a
vocational program, we estimate how the LATE varies for students who are below or above
the mean distance in the sample. These results are reported in column 2 of Table 3. The
size of the estimated coefficient is large (6.8 percentage points) and statistically significant
for higher-distance students, while it is smaller and not statistically significant for lower-
distance students. Consistently with the evidence reported in column 1, these heterogenous
track choice responses are more pronounced for students with a low GPA (column 3) whereas
they are indistinguishable both from each others and from zero among students with a high
GPA (column 4). As before, we check and verify the robustness of these results using two
alternative specifications for estimating the LATE parameter: cubic splines (Table C.4) and
local linear regressions (Table C.5).
Unconditionally on the track chosen, if the receipt of the cash transfer weakens the
household liquidity constraints, then we would expect students to choose more expensive
schooling options, for instance, in terms of attendance and transportation costs. Results
based on the estimation of Equations 1 and 2 using both parametric and non-parametric
specifications are reported in Table 4. The LATE of the cash transfer program is positive
and significant on the attendance cost associated with the preferred option solicited by the
applicants in our sample, with a magnitude in a range comprised between 290 and 344 MX$
depending on the specification, which corresponds roughly to 13-15 percent of the sample
mean of attendance costs for the most preferred schooling options. The LATE on the geodesic
19Higher ability students are also more likely be less financially constrained due to higher access to merit-
based scholarship at the upper secondary level. For instance, students whose COMIPEMS score are high
enough to enter UNAM options are provided with direct access to university programs of the same institution
- among the best ones in the country - and are automatically granted a scholarship that covers most of the
school-related expenses both at secondary and tertiary level.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous LATE on Vocational Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Low GPA High GPA
Takeup× Low GPA 0.114***
(0.032)
Takeup× High GPA 0.003
(0.030)
Takeup× Low Distance 0.045 0.063 0.036
(0.031) (0.051) (0.039)
Takeup× High Distance 0.068** 0.111** 0.039
(0.031) (0.051) (0.038)
P value: Takeup× low=Takeup× high 0.000 0.148 0.078 0.865
Observations 5232 5232 2443 2789
Clusters 2907 2907 1739 1916
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 2SLS estimates (quadratic
spline specification for the eligibility score). Standard errors clustered by values of the poverty
score are reported in parenthesis. High and Low GPA students are those with the overall Grade
Point Average (GPA) in lower secondary above and below the mean respectively. High and Low
Distance students are those whose distance from the close vocational option is above and below
the mean respectively.
distance between the location of the preferred schooling option and applicants’ residence is
also positive and sizable in magnitude, although it is significantly different from zero in only
one of the four different specifications (column 3).
4.4 Alternative Mechanisms
As described in Section 2.2, Oportunidades cash transfers are conditional on health and
schooling behaviors. Although there is no component of the transfer that is directly linked
to the high school track attended, we can not a priori rule out the possibility that our
results are the outcome of the conditional nature of the transfer. The requirement that each
eligible child has to be enrolled in school for receiving the scholarship component of the
transfer and that she cannot receive the transfer more than twice for the same grade may
potentially have a direct effect on school choices. For instance, students may strategically
select relatively easier schools so as to increase their chances of gaining admission, passing
grades and receiving Oportunidades scholarships up until the end of upper secondary.
We use Equation (3) to test whether or not the eligibility for the cash transfer has an
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Table 4: The Effects of Cash Transfers on the Schooling Costs of the First Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quadratic Spline Cubic Spline LLR-1BW LLR-0.5BW
Dependent Variable: Yearly Attendance Fees (MX$)
Takeup 290.081** 285.782* 343.750* 339.498
(138.614) (169.271) (188.126) (280.991)
Mean Dep. Var. 2,234 2,234 2,171 2,109
Observations 5232 5232 2852 1496
Clusters 2907 2907 1498 762
Dependent Variable: Geodesic Distance (Km) Between School and Residence
Takeup 0.686 1.000 2.264** 2.842
(0.690) (0.865) (1.130) (1.921)
Mean Dep. Var. 7.49 7.49 7.61 7.71
Observations 5232 5232 2075 1072
Clusters 2907 2907 1073 553
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. Total attendance fees include tools,
uniforms, monthly payments, registration and tuition. 2SLS estimates in columns 1 and 2.
Local Linear 2SLS estimates using the triangular Kernel in columns 3 and 4. The bandwidth
is chosen according to the optimal criterion in Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012]. Standard
errors clustered by values of the eligibility score are reported in parenthesis. Application-
year dummies are included in all specifications.
impact on the level of selectivity and/or difficulty of the most preferred high school option
in the application portfolios of the students in our sample. Given the assignment algorithm
(see Section 2.1), one plausibly good proxy measure for the expected probability of admission
in a given school is the corresponding cutoff score in the admission exam in the previous
year.20 Regression results reported in the top panel of Table 5 show that, irrespective of the
specification, the impact of the eligibility to the cash transfers on the cutoff score of the first
option requested in the school assignment system is small and not statistically significant
from zero. We next employ two measures of school difficulty. First, the school-average
performance amongst 12th graders in a national standardized achievement test in 2008 in
both language and math. Second, the school-level June pass rates in the academic year 2005-
20Since 2005, past cutoff scores for each schooling option have been made available through the
COMIPEMS website. This site is frequently checked by the applicants as it has become the main chan-
nel to pre-register and is also a key source of additional information about the system.
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2006. The corresponding estimates are reported in the bottom panels of Table 5, and mostly
reveal no effects of the eligibility to the Oportunidades cash transfer within those margins.21
Overall, we interpret these results as evidence that the findings discussed above are unlikely
to be directly or indirectly related to the compliance to the program conditionality among
children in program eligible households.
By relaxing the household financial constraints, the Oportunidades cash transfers have
been found to increase entry into entrepreneurship of the beneficiary parents [Bianchi and
Bobba, 2013]. Hence, an indirect channel through which the program may have tilted
high school track choices toward vocational options is through parental occupation choices.
We test this hypothesis using information on the occupational categories included in the
COMIPEMS application surveys and constructing indicator variables for whether or not
either the father or the mother of the students in our sample are self-employed. Table 6
reports the corresponding ITT estimates. Results show that they are positive for fathers
and negative for mothers but, once again, they are small in magnitude and not statistically
different from zero.
5 RD Estimates on Schooling Trajectories
5.1 School Assignment
We first establish empirically whether or not the observed change in preferences over tracks
triggered by the cash transfer affects admission outcomes within the school assignment sys-
tem. On average, technical options display lower attendance and transportation costs than
vocational ones (see Table 1), but they also require higher scores in the admission exam
(see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Therefore, more financially constrained students might de
facto reduce the probability of being assigned to their first option in the attempt to pursue a
more affordable one. For this purpose, we study whether or not the cash transfers provided
by the program increase the probability of being assigned to the first solicited option. The
estimated LATE is reported in the column 1 of Table 7 and shows a 7.8 percentage point
increase, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This is a large effect, as
it corresponds to roughly one quarter of the average probability of assignment in the first
solicited option in the sample.
We next study whether or not measures of ability and liquidity constraints can shape the
21A few ITT effects reported in Table 5 appear statistically significant in some specifications (negative
for the 12th grade score and positive for the pass rate).
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Table 5: Measures of School Selectivity/Difficulty of the First Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quadratic Spline Cubic Spline LLR-1BW LLR-0.5BW
Dependent Variable: Cutoff score in Previous Year
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -1.057 0.236 -0.016 -0.527
(1.490) (1.871) (2.054) (3.013)
Mean Dep. Var. 67.996 67.996 68.528 68.632
Observations 5232 5232 2508 1332
Clusters 2907 2907 1316 670
Dependent Variable: Mean 12th Grade Score (Spanish)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.031 -0.040 -0.075 -0.134**
(0.033) (0.039) (0.049) (0.064)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.388 0.388 0.379 0.373
Observations 5232 5232 2289 1216
Clusters 2907 2907 1187 621
Dependent Variable: Mean 12th Grade Score (Math)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.043 -0.042 -0.066 -0.128*
(0.043) (0.051) (0.055) (0.075)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.437 0.437 0.432 0.420
Observations 5232 5232 3098 1652
Clusters 2907 2907 1638 851
Dependent Variable: June Pass Rate
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.017* 0.010 0.011 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.660 0.660 0.659 0.663
Observations 5232 5232 2445 1305
Clusters 2907 2907 1281 658
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. OLS estimates for a polynomial specification
in columns 1 and 2. Local Linear Regression estimates using the triangular Kernel in columns 3
and 4. The bandwidth is chosen according to the optimal criterion in Imbens and Kalyanaraman
[2012]. Standard errors clustered by values of the eligibility score in parenthesis. Application-year
dummies are included in all specifications.
effect of the transfer on the probability of being assigned to the first option through their
underlying effects on preferences over schools/tracks (see Table 3).22 The GPA is strongly
22The increased probability of assignment to the first option might not be necessarily driven by a higher
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Table 6: The Effects of Cash Transfers on Parental Occupation Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quadratic Spline Cubic Spline LLR-1BW LLR-0.5BW
Dependent Variable: Father is Self-Employed (1 yes)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.014 0.038 0.018 0.071
(0.034) (0.041) (0.040) (0.056)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.324 0.324 0.328 0.329
Observations 5232 5232 3213 1746
Clusters 2907 2907 1711 901
Dependent Variable: Mother is Self-Employed (1 yes)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.009 -0.027 -0.070* -0.063
(0.027) (0.034) (0.039) (0.055)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.158 0.158 0.165 0.165
Observations 5232 5232 2146 1113
Clusters 2907 2907 1108 571
Note: * significant at 10%. OLS estimates for a polynomial specification in columns 1 and 2.
Local Linear Regression estimates using the triangular Kernel in columns 3 and 4. The bandwidth
is chosen according to the optimal criterion in Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012]. Standard errors
clustered by values of the eligibility score in parenthesis. Application-year dummies are included
in all specifications.
correlated with the exam score that determines the assignment, hence it is unlikely to observe
large differences in assignment for those within a relatively small GPA interval. Consistently,
we find that the size of the LATE is basically the same for Low and High GPA students,
although both coefficients are not statistically different from zero (column 2). Using the
same definition of High and Low distance as in Table 3, we indeed find that the LATE for
the former is almost double in size than the LATE for the latter (column 3), although we
cannot reject the null hypothesis at conventional levels that the two coefficients are the same.
probability of opting for the vocational track. Without modifying the preferred track choice, more liquidity
constrained students may, in principle, have used the Oportunidades transfer to access more selective (and
potentially more expensive) options. However, the evidence reported above is not consistent with any change
induced by the program in the selectivity of the first option (see Table 5), and/or in the applicants’ scores
in the COMIPEMS exams (see Table B.2). Since these two are the only possible margins along which
the program might have altered assignment outcomes in this setting, we are more inclined to interpret the
observed changes in assignment as the result of a preference shift between, rather than within, tracks.
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Table 7: The Effect of Cash Transfers on the Probability of Assignment




Takeup× Low GPA 0.073
(0.057)
Takeup× High GPA 0.077
(0.049)
Takeup× Low Distance 0.054
(0.052)
Takeup× High Distance 0.106**
(0.053)
P value: Takeup× low=Takeup× high 0.934 0.145
Mean Dep. Var. 0.301 0.301 0.301
Observations 5232 5232 5232
Clusters 2907 2907 2907
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 2SLS
estimates (quadratic spline specification for the poverty score). Standard er-
rors clustered by values of the poverty score in parenthesis. The score in the
COMIPEMS exam (in deciles), and application-year dummies are included in
all specifications.
5.2 High School Outcomes
We finally test whether or not the Oportunidades transfer led to an improvement in on-
time high school completion, as proxied by the probability of taking the ENLACE 12th
grade standardized exam three years after entry in high school.23 We contrast the results
23The 12th grade test is given to students who are on track to graduate at the end of the academic year,
and previous work [Dustan et al., 2017] has found that it is a good proxy for the probability of completing
high school on time. There are three main reasons why we focus on a proxy of on-time graduation when
assessing the medium-term impact of the cash transfer. First, as already discussed above, in Mexico the
share of students who complete high school on time is extremely low, and even lower among those in the
vocational track. This might be the result of a mismatch between students and school characteristics, partly
driven by the liquidity constraints that prevent students from choosing the school type that better fits their
talents and aspirations. Second, by looking at on-time completion we can clearly disentangle the effect of the
Oportunidades transfer induced by the change in preferences over high school tracks from the one induced
by the conditionality of the high school component of the transfer (see Section 2.2). Since the scholarship is
suspended after four years, the program conditionality does not provide incentives to complete high school
in the statutory three years. On the contrary, the change in high school preferences associated with the
relaxation of the liquidity constraints should be associated with a higher probability of completing high
school on time, partly as a result of a better match. Finally, the take-up of the ENLACE 12th grade exam is
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for those who took the ENLACE exam being registered in a vocational school (column 1
in Table 8) with those who took the test either being registered in a general or a technical
school (column 3 in Table 8). We find that receiving cash transfers led to an increase in
the probability of completing high school on time for students in a professional option,
by 2.7 percentage points. Although the coefficient is not statistically significant, the size
of the effect is not negligible since it corresponds to 10 percent of the variable’s standard
deviation. However, receiving Oportunidades has a negative and marginally significant effect
on the probability of completing high school in a general or a technical school. The negative
coefficient in column 3 may possibly capture the interaction between the disincentives to
graduate on time generated by the conditionality attached to the high school component of
the Oportunidades transfer, and the very strict promotion rules of the high school system
in Mexico.24 When we compare the LATE effects in columns 1 and 3, we can reject the
null hypothesis that the two coefficients are not statistically different. We interpret this as
evidence that for students attending a vocational school, the positive effect of Oportunidades
on school performance generated through a change in school track preferences more than
compensate the negative effect due to the program conditionality.
Consistently with the evidence discussed in sections 4.3 and 5.1, we find that the LATE
on on-time high school completion is statistically larger for those who live further away
from vocational schools (column 2 in Table 8). In order to rule out the possibility that the
heterogeneity in distance is driven by confounding factors - e.g, Oportunidades might have
differentially increased the returns to education in more remote areas, we test whether the
LATE on on-time graduation for tracks other than vocational varies with distance and find
no evidence to support this hypothesis (column 4 in Table 8).
the only high school outcome for which centralized administrative information is available. By matching the
COMIPEMS takers in the municipality of Ecatepec with the nationwide universe of ENLACE exam takers,
we are able to follow students irrespective of whether or not they have remained in the high school they had
been originally assigned to.
24Students must pass five out of eight disciplinary subject areas and practical modules, otherwise they
have to repeat the semester. Students who fail three or fewer subject areas can enroll in the next semester
but they have to attend and pass intensive courses (the so called regularizacion) during a fixed time window.
Partly as a result of the strict promotion rules, there are very high grade repetition and subject repetition
rates, 15.3 percent and 31.3 percent respectively in 2013. Previous work has documented the perverse effect
of Oportunidades on school performance in lower secondary [Dubois et al., 2012].
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Table 8: The Effect of Cash Transfers on High School On-Time Completion
Vocational on Time Any Other Track on Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Takeup 0.027 -0.092*
(0.028) (0.049)
Takeup× Low Distance 0.006 -0.094*
(0.030) (0.053)
Takeup× High Distance 0.051* -0.078
(0.030) (0.053)
P value: Takeup× low = Takeup× high 0.048 0.684
Mean Dep. Var. 0.073 0.073 0.326 0.326
Observations 5059 5059 5059 5059
Clusters 2856 2856 2856 2856
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 2SLS estimates (quadratic
spline specification for the poverty score). Standard errors clustered by values of the poverty score in
parenthesis. The score in the COMIPEMS exam (in deciles), and application-year dummies are included
in all specifications.
6 Conclusions
In spite of substantial differences in labor market returns by fields of study, there is little
systematic evidence available on the factors underlying students’ (and parents’) demand
for different curriculums (or tracks) in secondary education. Financial frictions and/or low
income levels can induce students from disadvantaged backgrounds to opt for schooling
options that do not correspond with either their skills or their career expectations. In this
paper, we explore the extent to which differences in cost and benefit across high school
tracks affect school choice decisions in the context of a high-stake assignment mechanism
in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. Quasi-experimental evidence that stems from
the discontinuity in the assignment of the Oportunidades cash transfer program documents
that an income shock increases the probability of choosing the vocational track for the sub-
population of students in the neighborhood of the program eligibility cutoff by 6-7 percentage
points. Although this is, by construction, a local effect that is difficult to extrapolate to other
segments of the student population, it draws on a policy-relevant sample of low-income
students in an urban setting within a large developing country.
As predicted by a standard school choice model with either credit constraints or a positive
income elasticity of demand for schooling, this effect is more pronounced amongst students
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who are more likely to reap higher returns from a vocational education (i.e. lower GPA in
lower secondary) and amongst those who are likely to face higher transportation costs in
accessing the associated school facilities. We have also shown that these short-run responses
to the cash transfer can translate into better academic trajectories in high school. These
findings provide further empirical support for demand-side subsidies, which partly cover
attendance and/or transportation costs (e.g. school vouchers) in order to increase enrollment
rates and schooling outcomes at the secondary level. The extent to which these policy levers
are able to improve transitions into the labor market and ultimately increase earnings is still
an open question.25
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Notes: Cutoff scores are defined as lowest score in the admission exam for each school participating in the
COMIPEMS system. Source: COMIPEMS administrative data (2010).
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Table A.1: Comparison of Mean Characteristics of the Municipality of Ecatepec with
Mexico City and Rest of Mexico
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecatepec Other Mun. in Federal Rest of
State of Mexico District Mexico
Panel A: Firms’ characteristics
Firm Size 3.50 4.12 7.83 4.71
Gross VA per worker (MX$ thous.) 570.5 720.5 2517.4 756.5
K per firm (MX$ thous.) 408.2 698.0 1533.1 883.1
Panel B: Labor market
Unemployment rate 0.045 0.046 0.063 0.040
Labor earnings (hourly MX$) 25.77 27.61 34.61 30.97
Panel C: Socio-demographics
School enrollment rate (age 6-14) 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.82
Poverty index 2.67 2.87 1.41 2.05
Panel D: COMIPEMS applicants
Family income (categorical) 4.67 4.71 5.47
Father educ. (categorical) 5.49 5.40 6.14
Mother educ. (categorical) 5.00 4.94 5.63
Indigenous 0.045 0.046 0.029
Probability of assignment 0.82 0.81 0.77
First option in the same Municipality 0.45 0.35 0.40
First option is over-subscribed 0.55 0.51 0.70
First option is vocational 0.07 0.08 0.07
First option is general 0.53 0.63 0.72
First option is technical 0.40 0.29 0.21
Source: Mexican economic census, 2008 (Panel A), labor market survey, 2008 (Panel B), population
census, 2000 (Panel C), and COMIPEMS administrative data, 2008 (Panel D).
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0 10 205 Kilometers
0 4 82 Kilometers
# Middle schools for COMIPEMS applicants
Notes: This map reports the geographic locations of the schooling options that participate to the
COMIPEMS assignment system during the period 2005-2010. The thick black line denotes the geographic
border between the Federal District and the State of Mexico. The thin grey lines indicate the borders of the
different municipalities that participate in the COMIPEMS system. The quadrant in the up-right corner
displays a close-up view of the Municipality of Ecatepec in which the markers reflect the locations of the
middle-schools of origin for the applicants in our sample.
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Accounting and Administration Health/Social
Tourism/Cosmetology Mixed specializations
Note: This figure reports the within track composition among the applicants’ first choices for some aggre-
gated categories of curricular sub-specializations that allow for a direct comparison between the vocational
and the technical tracks.
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Table A.2: Labor Market Returns to High School Tracks
Dependent Variable Log Hourly Earnings
Sample All Male Female
(1) (2) (3)
Highest Degree is Secondary -0.486*** -0.441*** -0.531***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.031)
Highest Degree is Secondary×Technical 0.074* 0.061 0.076*
(0.040) (0.047) (0.044)
Highest Degree is Secondary×Vocational 0.143*** 0.155*** 0.130**
(0.035) (0.053) (0.051)
Technical -0.059* -0.034 -0.080**
(0.034) (0.044) (0.034)




Urban 0.094*** 0.124*** 0.061
(0.024) (0.022) (0.038)
Number of Observations 9763 5340 4423
Number of Clusters 32 32 32
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS esti-
mates. Standard errors are clustered at the State level. Labor earnings are computed
for employed individuals between 16 and 35 years old who have completed at least lower
secondary education and went to a public high school in Mexico. Dummies for age and
State of residence are included in all specifications but are not reported. Source: Mex-
ico’s labor market survey linked with retrospective survey on educational trajectories
(ENOE-ENTELEMS, 2008).
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MX$ 10001 or more
MX$ 7001-10000
MX$ 4001-7000
MX$ 4000 or less
MX$ 10001 or more
MX$ 7001-10000
MX$ 4001-7000
MX$ 4000 or less
MX$ 10001 or more
MX$ 7001-10000
MX$ 4001-7000
MX$ 4000 or less
Notes: For each academic track, we report students’ expected income distribution within 5 years from
high school graduation, in case they decide not to continue their studies and obtain a university degree.
Nationally-representative sample of students who take a standardized end of high school test (ENLACE,
2009).
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B Validity of the RD Design: Further Evidence
Table B.1: Covariate Smoothness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quadratic Spline Cubic Spline LLR-1BW LLR-0.5BW
Dependent Variable: Applicant’s Age
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.005 -0.019 -0.013 0.031
(0.064) (0.078) (0.075) (0.106)
Mean Dep. Var. 15.440 15.440 15.437 15.449
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3058 1621
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1618 833
Dependent Variable: Applicant is Indigenous (1 yes)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.010 -0.012 -0.015 -0.007
(0.023) (0.028) (0.025) (0.035)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.095 0.095 0.084 0.088
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3162 1696
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1682 876
Dependent Variable: Number of HH members
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.043 0.066 -0.002 0.113
(0.108) (0.132) (0.113) (0.154)
Mean Dep. Var. 5.101 5.101 4.914 4.914
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3401 1858
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1819 955
Dependent Variable: Number of Disabled HH members
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.031 0.034 0.037 0.009
(0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.046)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.105 0.105 0.099 0.101
Number of Obs 5232 5232 2711 1428
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1427 723
Dependent Variable: Share of Children Enrolled in School
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.013 -0.028 -0.010 -0.043
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.900 0.900 0.897 0.907
Number of Obs 5232 5232 2408 1285
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1257 647
Dependent Variable: Number of Children in Primary
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.029 -0.036 -0.050 -0.023
(0.074) (0.092) (0.072) (0.096)
Mean Dep. Var. 1.570 1.570 1.474 1.449
Continued on Next Page.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quadratic Spline Cubic Spline LLR-1BW LLR-0.5BW
Number of Obs 5232 5232 4168 2367
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 2230 1233
Dependent Variable: Number of Children in Secondary
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.037 -0.025 0.006 0.107
(0.084) (0.104) (0.100) (0.148)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.807 0.807 0.823 0.810
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3126 1673
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1657 863
Dependent Variable: HH Head’s Education Attainment (years)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.144 -0.141 -0.150 -0.528
(0.209) (0.257) (0.257) (0.349)
Mean Dep. Var. 6.583 6.583 6.778 6.636
Number of Obs 5232 5232 2711 1428
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1427 723
Dependent Variable: HH Spouse’s Education Attainment (years)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.081 0.125 0.240 0.266
(0.200) (0.245) (0.258) (0.369)
Mean Dep. Var. 5.126 5.126 5.329 5.233
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3010 1587
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1589 814
Dependent Variable: HH Head Working (1 yes)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.034 -0.019 -0.035 -0.011
(0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.045)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.905 0.905 0.901 0.903
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3434 1877
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1840 965
Dependent Variable: HH Spouse Working (1 yes)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.002 -0.059* -0.039 -0.047
(0.028) (0.036) (0.033) (0.046)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.099 0.099 0.104 0.104
Number of Obs 5232 5232 3010 1587
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 1589 814
Note: * significant at 10%. OLS estimates for a polynomial specification in columns 1 and 2. Local
Linear Regression estimates using the triangular Kernel in columns 3 and 4. The bandwidth is chosen for
each dependent variable according to the optimal criterion in Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012]. Standard
errors clustered by values of the eligibility score in parenthesis. Application-year dummies are included in
all specifications.
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Table B.2: Test for Compositional Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quadratic Spline Cubic Spline LLR-1BW LLR-0.5BW
Dependent Variable: Individual in COMIPEMS registries (1 yes)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.006 -0.029 0.008 -0.028
(0.025) (0.032) (0.026) (0.036)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.421 0.421 0.446 0.449
Observations 12428 12428 8549 4782
Clusters 4924 4924 3301 1803
Dependent Variable: Score in the COMIPEMS Exam
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.966 0.063 -0.136 0.186
(1.260) (1.534) (1.433) (1.963)
Mean Dep. Var. 55.8 55.8 56.4 56.5
Observations 5232 5232 3015 1587
Clusters 2907 2907 1592 814
Dependent Variable: GPA in Lower Secondary
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) -0.009 0.048 0.041 -0.053
(0.058) (0.069) (0.084) (0.110)
Mean Dep. Var. 7.35 7.35 7.32 7.24
Observations 5232 5232 1861 955
Clusters 2907 2907 957 487
Dependent Variable: Geodesic Distance (Km) to the Closest Vocational School
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.026 0.011 0.088 0.322
(0.132) (0.162) (0.179) (0.249)
Mean Dep. Var. 3.04 3.04 2.99 3.02
Observations 5232 5232 2370 1273
Clusters 2907 2907 1234 640
Note: OLS estimates for a polynomial specification in columns 1 and 2. Local Linear Regression
estimates using the triangular Kernel in columns 3 and 4. The bandwidth is chosen according to
the optimal criterion in Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012]. Standard errors clustered by values
of the eligibility score are reported in parenthesis. Application-year dummies are included in all
specifications.
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C RD Estimates: Alternative Specifications
Table C.1: The Effects of Cash Transfers on Track Choices - Cubic
Splines
Vocational General Technical
Estimator (parameter) (1) (2) (3)
OLS (ITT)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.046* 0.008 -0.054
(0.024) (0.046) (0.045)
2SLS (IV-LATE)
Takeup 0.071* 0.012 -0.083
(0.037) (0.071) (0.070)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.092 0.465 0.443
SD Dependent Variable 0.289 0.499 0.497
Number of Observations 5232 5232 5232
Number of Clusters 2907 2907 2907
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Cubic spline specification for the eligibility score. Standard errors
clustered by values of the eligibility score in parenthesis. The depen-
dent variable Vocational/General/Technical takes the value 1 if a Voca-
tional/General/Technical option is listed first in the applicant’s portfolio.
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Table C.2: The Effects of Cash Transfers on Track Choices - Local Linear
Regressions
Estimator (parameter) Vocational General Technical
(1) (2) (3)
Local Linear Regression (ITT)
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.046** 0.015 -0.068
(0.020) (0.043) (0.045)
Local Linear Regression (IV-LATE)
Takeup 0.070** 0.024 -0.106
(0.031) (0.066) (0.071)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.090 0.473 0.444
SD Dependent Variable 0.286 0.499 0.497
Number of Observations 3908 3143 2792
Number of Clusters 2093 1670 1468
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Local Linear Regression estimates using the triangular Kernel. Standard errors clus-
tered by values of the eligibility score in parenthesis. The bandwidth is chosen ac-
cording to the optimal criterion in Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012].
Table C.3: The Effects of Cash Transfers on Track Choices -




Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.047** 0.010 -0.057
(0.023) (0.037) (0.036)
Cubic Spline
Score>Cutoff (1 yes) 0.052* 0.002 -0.054
(0.028) (0.047) (0.045)
Log Pseudo-likelihood -4885.72
Number of Observations 5232
Number of Clusters 2907
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Maximum Likelihood estimates. Standard errors clustered by values
of the poverty score are reported in parenthesis. The dependent vari-
able takes discrete consecutive values for Vocational/General/Technical
option as listed first in the applicant’s portfolio.
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Table C.4: Heterogeneous LATE on Vocational Choice - Cubic Splines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Low GPA High GPA
Takeup× Low GPA 0.125***
(0.039)
Takeup× High GPA 0.013
(0.037)
Takeup× Low Distance 0.055 0.095 0.029
(0.038) (0.063) (0.049)
Takeup× High Distance 0.079** 0.143** 0.033
(0.038) (0.063) (0.048)
P value H0: treatX low=treatX high 0.000 0.152 0.079 0.840
Observations 5232 5232 2443 2789
Clusters 2907 2907 1739 1916
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 2SLS estimates (cubic
spline specification for the eligibility score). Standard errors clustered by values of the poverty
score are reported in parenthesis.
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Table C.5: Heterogeneous Effects on Vocational Choice - Local Linear Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Low GPA High GPA
Takeup× Low GPA 0.133***
(0.037)
Takeup× High GPA 0.003
(0.030)
Takeup× Low Distance 0.047 0.087 0.026
(0.033) (0.058) (0.040)
Takeup× High Distance 0.085** 0.127** 0.064
(0.034) (0.058) (0.041)
P value H0: treatX low=treatX high 0.000 0.122 0.350 0.177
Observations 3908 3908 1846 2062
Clusters 2093 2093 1280 1394
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Local Linear 2SLS
estimates using the triangular Kernel. Standard errors clustered by values of the poverty score
are reported in parenthesis. The bandwidth is chosen according to the optimal criterion in Imbens
and Kalyanaraman [2012].
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